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Abstract
Through my research design, I will derive a trend of the average price of the S&P 500 for the past 100 years.
This trend will be a representation of the fundamental valuation of the stock market. Previous studies suggest
the S&P 500 should trend upward at 6-7% per year (Lynch 1989). Then, I analyze the deviation from this
trend during the mid-1980s bubble and the technology bubble of the late 1990s. I run a regression using
consumer confidence and sentiment indices. My modified hypothesis is that the deviation of actual S&P 500
prices from predicted “fundamental” S&P 500 prices during the years 1985- 2001 is started by changes in
consumer confidence and consumer sentiment. If the variables explain a lot of the deviation, then the herd
mentality theory predicts the creation and destruction of bubbles.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol10/iss1/15
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I. Introduction
While many economists define a bubbleas a deviation from stock marketfundamentals, Charles Kindleberger de-
fines a bubble as an upward price movement over an
extended range that tends to implode (Kindleberger
1996).  An extended negative bubble is a crash.  The
nature of these beasts makes them very important to
the investor.  Business schools teach students about
the efficient market hypothesis and the economically
rational individual.  Bubbles make investing difficult
because prices deviate from their fundamental valua-
tions.  Without market fundamentals being able to
predict prices, the investor is forced to learn new ways
of investing.  My research will analyze market indica-
tors to help predict bubbles.  A market indicator is a
factor that tends to reflect the movement of stock
market prices.
Three competing viewpoints exist on the
cause of bubbles.  The more traditional theory ap-
plied to market bubbles is the
adaptive expectation theory.
When individuals apply this
theory, they look to the past to
judge the correct price of a stock.
Ratios and trend analysis are im-
portant to picking a winning portfolio.  Subscribers to
the adaptive expectations theory believe investors are
backward looking in deciding on the correct price to
pay for a stock.  In the literature review section, sev-
eral previous studies will be presented to solidify this
argument.
Contrary to the adaptive expectations theory,
the rational expectations theory builds off the con-
cept that investors are forward looking.  Investors
act on the basis that they realize the correct model of
how the world works and that they use all available
information in deciding on their actions (Poole 2000).
Investors incorporate monetary policy and other mac-
roeconomic variables into their investment decisions.
Unlike price to earnings ratios and trend analysis, ra-
tional expectation variables are not based solely on
past performance.  As with the adaptive expectations
model, previous studies on rational expectations will
be studied in the literature review.
With both rational expectations and adaptive
expectations, investors base the price of a stock off
of some expected future profits discounted for the
time value of money.  The equation might look like
this:
P
stock    
= (Sum future Profits / (1+ r)t)/ Outstanding
Shares
where P is price of stock, r is the interest rate, and t is
the future time period that payments are expected to
be discounted.  The difference between the two theo-
ries is how they arrive at the ex-
pected future profit sum.  The
adaptive expectations model
looks towards the past to judge
this sum, while the rational expec-
tations model looks towards the
future and incorporates macroeconomic policies into
the valuation.  Both theories present a viable expla-
nation of the direction of stock prices over the long
run.
The long run theories of adaptive expecta-
tions and rational expectations do not present an ad-
equate reason on why stock prices fluctuate so im-
mensely from their fundamentals.  If the stock market
grows an average of 6% per year, why did S & P
500 prices increase in the 1980s and 1990s so dras-
tically? These changes in price valuation are so dra-
Bubbles make investing
difficult because prices
deviate from their funda-
mental valuations.
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matic that traditional models have a difficulty explain-
ing them (Poole 2000).  But if investors followed what
others did, the volatility in stock valuation might be
explained.  As Keynes said:
A conventional valuation which is established as the
outcome of the mass psychology of a large number of
ignorant individuals is liable to change violently as the
result of the sudden fluctuation of opinion due to fac-
tors which do not really make much difference in the
prospective yield (Shiller 2000).
So if investors are uninformed, how can the
unimportant variables that they use to base their in-
vestments on be measured?  Furthermore, how do I
even discover these extraneous variables?  This task
of discovery is quite impossible due to the large num-
ber of differing opinions on how stock should be
priced.  However, it is possible to judge the aggre-
gate effect of a crowds decisions by analyzing how
people react after they incorporate numerous vari-
ables into their investing decision.  A good measure of
peoples reaction are opinion indices like those based
on consumer confidence or consumer sentiment.  If
the crowd feels generally bullish about the market, a
bubble might form until it is popped by a general bear-
ish feeling about the market.  This general feeling of
bullish or bearish market sentiments is called herd
mentality.  This study focuses on investor confidence
and investor sentiment so that crowd psychology can
be analyzed.
While impossible to illuminate the individual
causes of herd mentality, the overall effect can be dis-
covered through opinion polls.  My hypothesis is that
when investors exhibit herd mentality in choosing
stocks, they create a market bubble.  Herd mentality
is measured through consumer confidence surveys.
Market bubbles will be the deviation of actual S&P
500 prices from the predicted fundamental S&P 500
prices.
Through my research design, I will derive a
trend of the average price of the S&P 500 for the
past 100 years.  This trend will be a representation of
the fundamental valuation of the stock market.  Pre-
vious studies suggest the S&P 500 should trend up-
ward at 6-7% per year (Lynch 1989).  Then, I ana-
lyze the deviation from this trend during the mid-1980s
bubble and the technology bubble of the late 1990s.
I run a regression using consumer confidence and sen-
timent indices.  My modified hypothesis is that the
deviation of actual S&P 500 prices from predicted
fundamental S&P 500 prices during the years 1985-
2001 is started by changes in consumer confidence
and consumer sentiment.  If the variables explain a lot
of the deviation, then the herd mentality theory pre-
dicts the creation and destruction of bubbles.
II. Literature Review
A. Adaptive Expectations
In investing, there has always been a division
between the investor that analyzes the past by look-
ing at price earnings ratios (P/E ratios), earnings per
share (EPS), and other ratios and the forward-look-
ing investor relying on rational expectations.  Under
the adaptive expectations model, investors look into
the past to judge what a stock will do in the future.
Their argument can be clearly illuminated by the state-
ment what a company will do in the future is best
represented by what theyve done in the past.  If this
model is accurate regarding stock price evaluation,
then variables that measure past performance should
correctly predict and explain variations in stock prices.
Biermann (1995) supports the idea that market prices
are determined from backward looking investors.  The
article discusses the use of price to earnings ratios to
determine excess market valuations.  Benjamin
Grahams book accurately deals with why markets
fluctuate and how to deal with the fluctuations (1973).
Graham discusses 5 basic points to recognizing mar-
ket bubbles.  Several of these points have to do with
price levels in relation to factors like growth and earn-
ings.  Grahams book allows a better understanding
of gauging market bubbles through an adaptive ex-
pectations model.
B. Rational Expectations
With rational expectations, investors focus on
the future.  If a company has hired a top-notch man-
agement staff, then they should be profitable in the
future.  Economic agents predict future events that
are not falsified by actual events.  Investors will con-
struct their opinions in such a way that on the aver-
age, they are correct.  Because of the focus on for-
ward looking behavior, rational expectation theory has
drastic implications in regards to bubbles (Shiller
2000).
            The major implication with rational expecta-
tion theory is that future events are already built into
the price equation of the stock so that only random
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news will cause the price change of a stock (Baxter
and Davis 1998).  This randomness in stock price
changes leads to the random walk theorya theory
about the unpredictability of stock price movements.
            While the conclusions reached from rational
expectation theory is highly interesting, the theory will
not be applied in this project.  However, the theory is
important to mention in the paper due to its contro-
versial methodology in stock market pricing.
C. Herd Mentality
Until recently, economists have avoided the
idea that herd mentality creates bubbles.  No formal
tests existed for asset-priced bubbles because the
hypothesis about how asset holders expectations
evolve over time did not exist (Diba 1990).  How-
ever, the advent of the rational expectations hypoth-
esis provided the foundation for rational bubbles.
             As Shiller points out in his book titled Irra-
tional Exuberance, completely rational people can
participate in herd behavior.  The behavior is indi-
vidually rational, but when combined produces group
behavior that mirrors irrationality (Shiller 2000).  The
reason for herd behavior according to his theory is
information cascade.  His idea of an information
cascade is simply reliance of an individual on anothers
choice.  For example, suppose two people decide to
go out to eat.  The first chooses one of two empty
restaurants simply by tossing a coin.  The second per-
son sees the first person eating in the restaurant and
concludes that it must be better since the first person
is eating in it.  As Shiller says, If all of them had been
able to pool their first impressions and discuss these
as a group, they might have been able to deduce
which restaurant was likely to be the better one.  But
in this scenario they cannot make use of each others
information, since they do not reveal their own infor-
mation to others when they merely follow them.  The
theory of information cascades is a theory of the fail-
ure of information about true fundamental value to be
disseminated and evaluated (Shiller 2000).  Individu-
als can be rational individuals and still exhibit herd
mentality.
              Extraneous factors can be incorporated into
the bubble model without violating rational expecta-
tions or long-run equilibrium towards fundamental
valuation.  The creation and destruction of a bubble
arises from some extraneous event that is of little sig-
nificance to the fundamental valuation of a stock (Diba
1990).  The very same reason why a bubble forms
may also destroy the bubble.  As mentioned previ-
ously, the specific cause of a bubble is quite difficult
to measure due to the irrelevance of the factor.  How-
ever, the growth of a bubble and its deviation from
fundamental valuation can be studied through herd
mentality.  The key importance of how bubbles oper-
ate is that the individual investor realizes that the asset
is overpriced.  Bubbles form because of the herd
mentality that exists in crowds.  This herd mentality
can be explained by how investors view their over-
valued assets.  A bubble grows at an exponential rate
greater than the fundamental valuation growth rate
because an agent would not hold an overvalued asset
unless they expect it to be overvalued a sufficiently
greater amount next period (Diba 1990).  Another
way of stating this concept is called the greater fool
theory.  The investor realizes that the stock is over-
valued, but is willing to pay the amount because he
thinks that there is a greater fool that will pay even
more for the price of the stock.  The realization of the
overvaluation, but willingness to invest is herd men-
tality.  Figure 1 shows a diagram of how bubbles ex-
pand.
The cyclical nature of the bubble is evident
from the diagram in Figure 1.  Initially, asset prices
rise (either by a general rise in fundamental prices or
herd mentality).  However, the bubble forms when
investors jump on the bandwagon to profit from
rising prices.  They borrow money from investment
institutions because of their increased wealth.  This
borrowing leads to even greater asset prices.  How-
ever, the bubble will eventually burst. Figure 2 shows
how and why bubbles burst.
Why bubbles pop can be any extraneous fac-
tor that has little correlation to how stocks are valued
(Diba 1990).  However, the downward spiral of stock
prices mirror the upward expansion in a bubble.  As
seen from the diagrams, bubbles are self-perpetuat-
ing once they form.
The two most famous market bubbles in his-
tory are tulip mania and the South Sea land specula-
tion bubble.  Mackays book studies the herd men-
tality of both of these events (Mackay 1996).
Mackays description of the growth rate of the bubble
in the South Sea land speculation relates to the greater
fool theory.  John Law informed the public of the great
prosperity of the company and the people believed
that the price could be supported at an even higher
level (Mackay 1996).  This belief of price support in
overvaluation is once again illuminated by herd men-
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tality.  As Diba points out, over reliance on outside
recommendations is a signal of the presence of herd
mentality.
A legend of Wall Street, Phillip Carret offers
insight into successful speculation.  His book de-
fines the machinery of markets and the vehicles of
speculation to better understand market bubbles
(Carret 1997).  Chapters 4 and 5 of his book deal
with market movements in terms of ripples and
waves.  Instead of using the term market bubble,
Carret defines market separation from economic fun-
damentals as a tide of speculation.  Through his ideas
on the tide of speculation, herd mentality plays a
vital role in stock market bubbles.  An example of the
tide of speculation is demonstrated in the virtual
model constructed by an economist from the Univer-
sity of Bonn named Thomas Lux.  Lux created a vir-
tual model of 500 agents trading one commodity
(Chang).  Some of the traders used a strategy that
hinged upon the commoditys fundamental value,
which fluctuated randomly. Others traded based on
market trends, a sort of trader see, trader do strat-
egy (once again, the greater fool theory arises).  Vir-
tual traders could also switch strategies depending on
which seemed to be doing better (Chang). We see
in our model, the price dynamics reflect fundamental
values but only to an extent, Lux says. We think
this shows one needs to pay more attention, one has
to stress more the interaction of agents, which has
been neglected in economics up to now.
III. Research Design
Deviation of market prices from fundamental
stock prices due to herd mentality is the central theme
of this research paper.  Investors rationally choose to
invest in an overpriced asset because they believe that
others will pay even more for the asset.  To measure
this belief, I use measures of consumer confidence
and sentiment.  If a high percentage of people are
overly optimistic about the economy, the stock mar-
ket will become overvalued.  Herd mentality devel-
ops because investors think prices will keep going
upthey are too confident in the economic health of
the market and ignore warning signs of a troubled
economy.  The development of bubbles will be the
focus of my project.
While bubbles develop because of the band-
wagon effect through herd mentality, the self-perpetu-
ating nature of bubble is caused by momentum.  Only
the effect of herd mentality on a bubbles creation
and destruction will be analyzed.  The momentum ef-
fect that causes the extreme expansion and contrac-
Note:  This diagram also incorporates the effect that
banks have on bubble contraction.  Diagram is from
CAW TCA Newsletter.  December 1998 v4 n2.
FIGURE 1
How Bubbles Expand
Note:  This diagram also incorporates the effect that
banks have on bubble expansion.  Diagram is from CAW
TCA Newsletter.  December 1998 v4 n2.
FIGURE 2
How Bubbles Contract
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tion of bubbles will be discussed in the appendix.
To measure herd mentality, I include variables
on investor exuberance.  As the confidence in the
market increases, investors will drive the prices away
from the fundamentals (Diba 1990).  This separation
from market fundamentals is the beginning of a stock
market bubble.  My research will measure the corre-
lation between investor confidence (measured by sev-
eral different surveys) and the separation of a prede-
termined fundamental market price.  The measure
of the fundamental market price is defined in the de-
pendent variable analysis section.
Since investor confidence is a measure of herd
mentality, a high correlation between the independent
and dependent variable illustrates the relationship of
market expansions and contractions with herd men-
tality.
A. Dependent variable analysis
The premise of a bubble is simply the devia-
tion of stock prices from their fundamental values.
However, some interesting questions arise.  What is
the fundamental value of a stock and how is it deter-
mined?  When is the deviation from the fundamental
price a bubble and when is it simply a random fluc-
tuation?  In my model, the fundamental price of the
stock market is the average growth in the S&P 500
over the past 50 years.  This average growth is mea-
sured with a trend line created through regression
analysis. By creating a trend line, the deviation of ac-
tual prices from their predicted fundamental prices
can be measured.  The deviation from the average
growth represents a possible bubble.  The definition
of when a bubble is present and when it is not is highly
debated.  Some economists argue that a bubble is
present when a 5% deviation occurs from actual stock
prices and their fundamental prices (Kindelberger).
Others argue that the deviation must be greater.  Since
the literature I have read often refers to the bubble
that the market has been in since the mid 1980s, I will
interpret any deviation of actual prices from their pre-
dicted fundamental as the result of a market bubble.
Specifically, the deviation of
stock market prices will be
measured from 1985-2001.
Table 1 presents the depen-
dent variable.
The first step of run-
ning the regression is to iden-
tify a fundamental stock
price valuation for the S&P 500.  By finding the fun-
damental price, I can compare the actual price to the
fundamental price.  The deviation of the price be-
tween the two represents a market bubble.
Running a linear regression of monthly
S&P500 data from 1951-2001, I discover that the
trend line is
Ln S&P 500 = 3.321 + .058X
Using a log-linear regression, I achieved an
R2 value of almost 40 points higher than running a
simple regression.  Also, I deleted the years of 1994-
2001 in the equations trend line.  As Kindleberger
mentioned (1996), the mid 1990s and beyond had
such a great increase in prices that the fundamental
price equation would have been thrown off a great
deal.  Therefore, the trend line is only based on his-
toric S&P 500 data from 1951-1993.  However, to
measure the deviation for post 1993 years, the trend
line was simply extended until 2001.
The independent variable is years beginning
with 1951 (year 1).  1952 is year 2, etc.  However,
the dependent variable is ln S&P 500 instead of the
S&P 500.  To arrive at the S&P 500 as the depen-
dent variable instead of the ln S&P 500, the anti-log
must be taken for the equation.
eLn S&P 500 = e3.321 + e.058X
or
S&P 500 = e3.321 + e.058X
Now, the fundamental price of the S&P 500
is represented by the equation abovex being the
current year minus the base year (1951).  To arrive at
the S&P 500 predicted fundamental price for the year,
input the adjusted basis year (i.e.  For 1990 [x=40],
the predicted S&P 500 fundamental price should be
281.744.  To better understand the equation, figure 3
shows actual S&P 500 prices versus their predicted
fundamental prices.
The next step was to measure the deviation
of S&P 500 prices from the
fundamental price line during
the years 1985-2001.  This
deviation is simply actual
S&P 500 stock prices mi-
nus the predicted fundamen-
tal stock prices.  The pre-
dicted fundamental prices
1ELBAT
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were calculated from the regression equation. To make
the data easier to understand, I have created Table 2,
which lists the deviation of stock prices from 1985-
2001.
To summarize, the dependent variable is mea-
sured by the deviation of actual S&P 500 prices from
the predicted fundamental S&P 500 prices.  The fun-
damental price equation is simply the anti-log of the
logarithmic price equation.  The logarithmic price
equation was calculated using log-linear regression
analysis on the S&P 500 prices from the years 1951-
1993.
B. Independent Variables
The independent variables represent inves-
tors herd mentality.  As defined previously, herd men-
tality is measured through the confidence level of the
economic agents that interact with the economy.  Table
3 presents 5 different variables.  Each variable is used
to measure herd mentality.
Five separate regressions will be run.  Each
regression will analyze the significance of the variable
in explaining the deviation of actual stock prices from
the predicted fundamental valuations.  For the vari-
ables Confide and FH, only data back to 1992 could
be gathered.  Therefore, the regression analysis will
only be from 1992-2001 for those two variables.
The coefficients above all deal with consumer
confidence.  By measuring consumer confidence, the
exuberance of investors can be measured.  The
ConEcon, ConSent, FH, and Confide variables all
measure how consumers feel about the economy.  As
in Shillers restaurant example, if everybody is exu-
berantly happy, then word of mouth will spread to
other investors.  Shiller compares this compounding
effect to Kirmans study of ants (Shiller 2000).
It has been found experimentally that ants, when
presented with two identical food sources near their
nest, tend to exploit both sources, but one more
intensively than another...ants individually recruit
other ants to food sources; there is no central di-
rection for the nest as a whole.  Recruitment is done
by contact and following (tandem recruitment) or
by laying a chemical trail (pheromone recruitment).
Both of these processes are the ant equivalent of
word-of-mouth communication.
Shiller states that recruitment is done through
contact.  As in Shillers example of the ants exploita-
tion of one identical food source over another, in cer-
tain periods of time investors choose stocks because
of what others saynot based solely on the funda-
mental pricing of a stock.  Herd mentality exists and
drives up the price of stocks.  If the stocks seem at-
tractive and word-of-mouth communication is increas-
ing, consumers are generally going to be confident.
By measuring this confidence and using regression
analysis to compare it to deviations of stock market
prices from their fundamentals, the effect of herd men-
tality on the market can be illustrated.
V. Results
Using the deviation of actual S&P 500 prices
from their predicted fundamental valuation as the de-
pendent variable, regressions were run using each of
the consumer confidence indices as the independent
variable.  As mentioned in the previous section, if the
variables are highly significant and have a high R2 value,
much of the deviation of stock prices can be explained
through changes in consumer confidence.  As Shiller
mentions, people are ready to believe the majority
view or to believe authorities even when they plainly
contradict matter-of-fact judgment.  The consumer
confidence indices used measure the majority view.
If the majority view (consumer confidence index) is
significant in the regression results, herd behavior
theory can be applied to stock market pricing.  Table
4 presents the five separate regression results.
All of the variables are significant at alpha lev-
els of 0.1.  At an alpha level of 0.05, only the ConBus
variable is insignificant.  While the R2 values are not
extremely high, the unpredictability of the stock mar-
ket makes the results seem quite satisfactory.
            Shiller says we saw evidence of strangely
high investor confidence and undiminished expecta-
tions for the market.  Once again, herd mentality
coincides with consumer confidence.  These undimin-
ished expectations are an example of the greater fool
theory.  Investors jump on the bandwagon when oth-
ers are confident about the market.  This irrational
exuberance elevates stock markets.  The regression
results support the argument of investor confidence
creating a bandwagon effect.  How much stock prices
deviate and for how long are matters of momentum.
However, confidence creates an exuberance which
gets investors paying more and more for stocks.  This
frenzy drives stock prices away from their fundamen-
tals.  When consumer confidence is high, stock prices
separate the most from their fundamentals.
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VI. Conclusion
While investors, economists, and research-
ers are grappling with the idea of what is a bubble,
this project has tried to clarify the definition and mea-
sure their existence.  I defined bubbles as simply the
separation of actual S&P 500 stock prices from their
fundamental valuations.  Because herd mentality
causes the expansion and contraction of bubbles, it is
necessary to measure it in order to predict bubbles.
However, it is impossible to quantify the variable herd
mentality.  Instead, consumer confidence was sub-
stituted because of its quantifiable nature and corre-
lation with herd mentality.  The relationship between
confidence indices and stock market deviations could
be analyzed.  If the regression results showed a high
significance, herd mentality drives the separation of
stock prices from their fundamentals.
The results showed that a highly significant
relationship existed between consumer confidence
indices and the deviation of actual S&P 500 prices
from their fundamental valuations.  Herd mentality
drives this deviation which creates a bubble.
Throughout the paper, the focus has been on
predicting and measuring bubbles.  But for the inves-
tor, what should be the course of action.  Shiller (2000)
suggests a radical approach of getting out of the stock
market:
The high recent valuations in the stock market come
about for no good reasons.  The market level does not,
as so many imagine, represent the consensus judg-
ment of experts who have carefully weighed the long-
term evidence.  The market is high because of the com-
bined effect of indifferent thinking by millions of people,
very few of whom feel the need to perform careful re-
search on the long-term investment value of the aggre-
gate stock market, and who are motivated substan-
tially by their own emotions, random attentions, and
perceptions of conventional wisdom.
Contrary to Shillers opinion, Phillip Carret opines
about a different solution.  When asked during a time
of persistently declining prices whether the stocks
would rally, he laconically responded They always
have. (Carret 1996).  It is up to the individual inves-
tor to decide whose opinion weighs with more im-
portance.
In future projects, I will refine the confidence
variables. By lagging confidence indices over time,
future prices can be predicted.  Also, I will look at
other factors that influence stock market bubbles.
Does past performance of certain stocks indicate an
overvaluation? Are the Adaptive Expectations and ra-
tional expectations theories accurate at reflecting the
price levels of stocks?
One of the most interesting questions is what
drives a bubble.  If herd mentality creates and de-
stroys a bubble, how does momentum play a factor
in the continuation of a bubble?  These ideas offer a
plethora of future research.
Appendix
The stock market boom is made up of a multitude of
factors.  To suggest that herd mentality alone drives
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stock prices would be unfounded and absurd.  While
herd mentality may start the process of bubble for-
mation and destruction, other factors like momentum,
amplification mechanisms, and cultural influences af-
fect the deviation of stock prices from their funda-
mentals.  Shillers book Irrational Exuberance lists
twelve different causes for the great expansion of
stock prices in the 1990s.  To fully comprehend how
bubbles operate, it is necessary to review these theo-
ries.  Otherwise, the concept that herd mentality, mea-
sured by consumer confidence, can predict bubbles
will be overly relied upon.  As Phillip Carret points
out:
Prices on the New York Stock Exchange are affected by
French politics, German banking conditions, wars and
rumors of wars in the Near East, the Chinese monkey
market, the condition of the wheat crop in The Argen-
tine, the temper of the Mexican congress as well as by
a host of domestic influences.  The successful specu-
lator must carefully weigh the effect of all these influ-
ences, set down the pros and cons and arrive at a sound
conclusion as to the side on which the balance lies.
When he has done all this he has made only a begin-
ning.  If he concludes that the balance favors an up-
ward movement, he must still decide which stocks he
is to buy for maximum profit.
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